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IN TI-IE SUPRENiE cou·RT
OF THE S'I'fa~rTE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

\

Plain ti /Jir '
vs.

;·

' Case No.

HENRY RUGGERI, Judge,
Defend an I.

I

10631

J

BRIEF OF PLAII\TTIFF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The State of Utah, acting through the District
Attorney of the Third Judicial District, seeks an extraordinary writ compelling the Honorable Henry Ruggeri, District Judge, sitting by request in the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, to withdraw his
order of :May 20, 1966, ordering the suppression of
testimony given by C. W. Brady, Jr., before a grand
.iury in Salt Lake County and, therefore, making it
unavailable for use in Criminal Case No. 19531 in the
District Court of Salt Lake County.
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DISPOSITION IN LO,\TER COURT
On December 20, 1965, a grand jury sitting in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, returned an indictment
against C. W. Brady, Jr., charging him with the crime
of perjury in the first degree in violation of Section
76-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Subsequently,
demands were made for bills of particulars, and various
motions filed and determined. On March 24, 1966,
C. W. Brady, Jr., filed a motion to suppress, along
with a certificate of counsel. Brady sought to suppress
the testimony he gave before the Salt Lake County
grand jury on August 16, 1965. On May 20, 1966, the
defendant, Judge Henry Ruggeri, granted the motion
of Brady to suppress his testimony.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks an extraordinary writ against
defendant compelling the withdrawal of the order of
suppression and allowing the evidence of Mr. C. W.
Brady's testimony before the Salt Lake County Grand
Jury on August 16, 1965, to be used in the prosecution
of Criminal Case No. 19531 in Salt Lake County.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff submits the following statement of
facts:
C. W. "Buck" Brady, Jr., was indicted for the
crime of perjury in the first degree. The alleged per2

Jurious testimony was given before a grand jury conrened in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 1).
Subsequent to the indictment, a motion to suppress the
testimony given by Brady to the grand jury was made.
The essence of the motion of Brady was that he had
Leen a target of the grand jury's investigation an<l had
not been allowed to have counsel in the grand jury room
to advise him during the course of the interrogation
(R. 24). Because of these failings, it was contended that
the accused's rights to counsel under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of th~
United States and Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of the State of Utah were violated ( R. 25,
30), and also his right against self-incriminaion under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U nite<l
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12, of the
Utah State Constitution (R. 25). Attached to the
motion was a certificate of counsel (R. 27) , setting forth
the occurrences in the grand jury room prior to the
time Brady gave his testimony. A copy of the same
certificate has been attached to the answer of the defendant to the complaint for extraordinary relief in the
instant proceeding.
Brady appeared before the grand jury and in
response to the first question, asked if he was "allowed
to have counsel" (R. 27). The complaint in this case
alleges that Brady had, in fact, consulted with counsel
prior to appearing before the jury. Defendant's
answer conyeniently denies the allegation because of
lac>k of information, although counsel for defendant
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herein is counsel for Brady and Brady is, in effect,
privy to this action. However, the issue in this proceeding must remain in doubt, except to the extent that
the record may validly lead to the inference that Brady
was, in fact, well coached before he entered the grand
jury room. After finally giving his name and address,
Brady asked if he could have counsel and the district
attorney inquired if he wanted counsel and Brady stated
(R. 28):
"I would like counsel. I wouldn't demand it.
I just want it on the record that I did ask for it
is all." (Emphasis added.)
The district attorney then explained that Utah
statutory law does not allow the presence of counsel.
He then advised the witness that as to anything that
might tend to incriminate him, no matter what the
subject, the witness could invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination. Thereafter, the district attorney also
informed the witness of the decision in Escobedo v.
[Illinois], 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and asked if he were
taking the position that he was not a volunteer witness. The witness then responded ( R. 29) :
"I want to be a volunteer witness, but I did
want to find out about counsel because I feel
as though I should have counsel. I have been a
law enforcement officer for so many years and
always advised people of counsel. However, like
I say, I am not going to sit here and demand
counsel. Just want it as a matter of record that
I asked for it because I come here as a willing
witness."

4

The questioning then commenced and, thereafter,
no claim of self-incrimination was invoked nor request
to recess lo consult counsel was made, and the witness
allege(lly perjured himself.
The exhibit attaC'hed to the plaintiff's complaint
shows one other feature of the testimony of the witness,
that at the time he testified he was the Public Safety
Commissioner of Utah, and the same allegation is made
in the complaint, although the defendant candidly
doesn't know the truth of the allegation.1
Further, the record of proceedings at the time of the
motion to suppress indicate certain relevant facts were
also admitted. This record is before the court pursuant
to preliminary order. Brady's testimony was given before the grand jury on August 16, 1965, but the indictments against him on all charges were not returned until
December, 1965 (R. 61). l\1r. l~rady had been charged
in May of 1965 with the crimes of bribery and making
profit off of public monies (R. 61, pltf's compl. 2, para .
.5). The charges were heard before the Honorable Mel,·in H. Morris, City Judge of Salt Lake City, and
dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence (R. 61,
pltf's compl. p. 2, para. 5). At the time of Mr. Brady's
appearance before the grand jury on August 16, 1965,
he appeared at the jury room voluntarily and was apparently given a subpoena at that time (R. 69).
Based on the above state of the record, the defendto tbc :<::cuo of a publi(' official and is
approrrh:te for judicial nn~ice ~cc'ion ~2-23-1(5), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.

(])The maU.:;· relc.tes

5

ant granted Brady's motion to suppress. The def enda 11 t
in his order found that Brady was under compulsion
of a subpoena, and the subject of inquiry before the
grand jury was whether Brady had committed a crime
and he was subsequently charged with a crime. 'fl1e
court concluded that Brady was compelled in the
absence of counsel to give evidence against himself
(R. 54).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION OF C. W. BRADY TO SUPPRESS HIS TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY GRAND JURY
TO THE EXTENT HE FOUND A CONSTI'l'll·
TIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF A WIT·
NESS BEFORE A GRAND JURY.
The plaintiff submits that there is no constitu·
tional right to counsel before a grand jury, either under
the Constitution of the United States or under the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
The trial court apparently found a constitutional
right to counsel before a grand jury. It has been the
traditional rule in this country that counsel is not
allowed to be present on behalf of a witness or a suspeet
during a grand jury inquiry. Enker and Elsen, Counsel
for the Suspect: Messiah v. United States and Esco6

/11'do v. United States, 49 l\Iinn. L. Rev. 47, 73 ( 1965).

In this regard, the provisions of Section 7'7-19-D, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, imn-:cles in its pertinent parts
tliat the district attorney may appear before the grand
jury, as may witnesses, the deputies of the district
attorney, the attorney general and his assistants or
rleputies in particular instances, and the special counsel
for the grand jury when he is appointed. Further, the
statute proYides that under certain circumstances, stenographers, interpreters and the grand jury reporter
may also be present. No other person may be present.
and the statute expressly so states.

In Orfield, Criminal Procedure Under the Federal
Rules, sec. 6 :24 ( 1966) , it is noted:
"A witness testifying before the grand jury
is not entitled to the aid of counsel."
In In Re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2nd Cir. 1931),
fodge Learned Hand stated:
"The appellant insists, that before a witness
is compelled to testify before a grand jury, he
should be appraised of the subject matter of the
inquiry or the names of the persons against whom
the inquiry is addressed, and that he should not
be called upon to go unaided by counsel to an
inquiry which is unlimited in scope and .f~r which
he is entirely unprepared. But the privilege of
a ,vitness aO'ainst self-incrimination is personal.
Neither at ~ trial nor before a qrrmd ,jury is he
entitled to have the aid
couuscl when testif;i/inq. It is hard to see why he must be warned of
th'e nature or extent of his testimony which is

of
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likely to be called for. A witness is not entitled
to be furni_shed with facilities for invading issues
or concealmg true facts. Every bonafide investigation by a grand jury seeks to ferret out crime
and criminals. To detect crime and to present
charges against the guilty requires the most
ample power of investigation. Frequently,
neither the nature of the crime itself nor the
identity of criminals can be forecast. To be compelled to state either in advance we think is likelv
unnecessarily to impede investigation and obstruct the administration of justice."
The court went on to note the rather substantial author·
ity to the effect that a defendant need not be advised
as to the nature of matter under investigation nor provided with counsel.
The case of Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906),
is cited to support the proposition that an individual
need not be informed of the nature of the matter under
investigation. Numerous other lower federal court
cases are cited in Orfield, supra, sec. 6 :22, in support
of the same conclusion and the lack of right to counsel.
Therefore, it is apparent that at the present time, there
is no right to counsel before a grand jury.
Further supporting the proposition that the tra·
ditional rule does not allow counsel to be present at
the time of interrogation of a witness by the grand
jury is the United States Supreme Court's promulgation of its own Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 6 ( d)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prior to
July 1, 1966, provided:
8

"Attorneys for government, the witnesses under examination, interpreters when needed, and
for the purpose of taking evidence, a stenographer, may be present while the grand jury is in
session, but no person other than the jurors may
be present while the grand jury is deliberating
or voting."
Consequently, it appears that the United States Supreme Court has, itself, acknowledged the traditional
constitutional and common law limitations upon persons who may be present during grand jury investigations. Certainly, if there were a constitutional requirement providing that counsel must be present if the
witness so desires it, it would have been spelled out
by the United States Supreme Court in Rule 6(d) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Further,
it is important to note that although the United States
Supreme Court most recently promulgated new rules
of federal criminal procedure, American Bar Association, Criminal Law Section Bulletin, March 21, 1966,
p. 6, effective I July 1966, the only amendment to
Rule 6 ( d) was a provision allowing the operator of a
a recording device to be present, Second Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the United States District Courts, Judicial Conference of the United States, March, 1964<.
Certainly, the Supreme Court was aware of the
counsel issue since it had most recently decided Escobedo
1'. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 ( 1964), and ltliranda v. Ari~rma, ____ U.S. ____ , 16 L. Ed. 694 (1966), was decided
prior to the effective <late of the new rules.
9

In Enker and Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect:
Messiah v. United Stales and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49
Minn. L. Rev. 47, 74 (1965), it is stated:
. "Permitting attorneys to be present in a grand
Jury room during the taking of testimony might
constitute a serious breach of grand jury secrecy
which could hamper investigations and prosecutions."
The authors cite the provisions of Federal Rules 6 ( d)
and 6 ( e) requiring secrecy.
It should be remembered that there is a substantial
difference between the nature of a grand jury investigation and the nature of a police interrogation in a
"back room." Escobedo and Miranda were directed
against police interrogations, not the deliberative and
investigative functions of a traditional legal body. The
case of Escobedo v. Illinois was very unique. Danny
Escobedo had been denied an opportunity to consult
with counsel even though counsel appeared present at
a Chicago police department and requested permission
to speak to him and even though Escobedo himself re·
quested permission to speak to his attorney. In Esco·
bedo, the court said:

"We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken
into police custody, the police carry out a P.r~c.ess
of interrogations that lends itself to ehc1tmg
incrimnating statements, the suspect has re·
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quested and been denied an opportunitv to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not
effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been
denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as
'made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v. "\Vainwright, 372
U.S., at 342, 9 L.ed.2d at 804, 93 A.L.ll.2d 733,
and that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him
at a criminal trial."
It should be noted that in the Escobedo case, the
court spoke about "being taken into police custody."
The court said that it is when the "police carry out a
process of interrogation." Further, the court indicated
that where the "police have not effectively warned him."
Consequently, it is the police that the Escobedo case
is directed at and not the judicial function of a grand
jury. Under Escobedo, the interrogations must have
reached the accusatory stage and not merely be investigatory. In the instant case, there is no showing that
the interrogation was in the accusatory stage. The grand
jury was empaneled as a general investigatory body.
There was no indication that Mr. Brady was before
the grand jury because he was being accused of any
particular crime. At best, the grand jury was acting
as a body of general inquiry.

The United States Supreme Court has noted that
there are substantial differences between interrogation
m a stationhouse and that before a grand jury. In
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In Re Graban, 352 U.S. 330, 337-348 (1957), the
Supreme Court seemed to note the distinction and considered it more than an academic distinction but a
rather substantial one.
In Otney v. United States, 340 F.2d 696 (10th
Cir. 1965), Chief Judge .Murrah stated that the decision
in Escobedo applied to "any extra judicial examination," thus implying that it was not applicable to judicial
proceedings and hence would not be applicable to grand
jury proceedings.
In the Graban case, supra, the court ruled that
there was no constitutional right for an individual to
have counsel before an administrative investigation
by the State Fire Marshall. In a five to four majority,
the court held that a fire marshall need not have provided counsel for the individual called to testify before
him.Justice Reed, speaking for the court, observed that:
"A witness before a grand jury cannot insist
as a matter of constitutional right on being represented by counsel * * *. There is no more reason to allow the present of counsel before a fire
marshall trying in the puhlic interest to determine the cause of a fire * * * [In both situations,
evidence obtained] may possibly lay a witness
open to criminal charges, but until such charges
are made in a criminal proceeding, the witness'
protection is the privilege against self-incriminanation."
Thus, the Grogan case would clearly be precedent in
this instance for denying any contention that the de-
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fendant in this case is entitled to counsel before the
Salt Lake County Grand Jury or should have been
adYised of a specific right to have counsel.
Recently, in State v. Stallings, 25 Conn. Supp.

386, 206 A.2d 277, ( 1964), the issue was before the

Connecticut court as to whether an accused man was
entitled to have counsel with him before a grand jury.
The court noted that proceedings before a grand jury
were "not a critical stage in the prosecution that requires
the presence of counsel," citing Connecticut cases ancl
the decision of United States e;r rel. Cooper v. Reineke,
333 F.2d 608, 611 (2nd Cir. 1963).
In State v. Braash, 119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289
(1951), this court stated, at page 460, loc. cit., regarding the right to counsel at preliminary hearing:
"But under the circumstances of this case, such
failure did not constitute prejudicial error. The
preliminary hearing is an inquiry, not a trialit is held in the place of a common law of grand
jury where the accused is only present if called
as a witness and is never represented by counsel."
In Directory Services, Inc. v. United States, 353
F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1965), the Eighth Circuit had occasion to consider the question of the right to counsel
before a grand jury. Although the court did not reach
the merits of the appeal and dismissed the case on a proL'edure point, the court observed:
"If the merits of the appeal were reached, appellant would be no better off. The government
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has also moved to dismiss upon the ground that
the appeal is frivilous. Such contention must
be sustained. Rule of Criminal Procedure 6D
emphasizes the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 370, 77 S.
Ct. 510, l L. Ed. 376, held that a witness had
no right to be represented by counsel in an investigative procedure conducted by a state fire
marshall under Ohio law. In support of its de
cision, the majority opinion at page 333, 77 S.
Ct. at page 513, states:
'A witness before a grand jury cannot insist,
as a matter of constitutional right on being
represented by his counsel.'
Supporting cases are cited in the footnote. Mr.
Justice Black in a dissenting opinion at pages
346-347, 77 S. Ct. 510, agrees that counsel for
a witness cannot be allowed before a 'grand jury'
but holds the fire marshall situation to be dis·
tinguisha ble.
For other cases discussing the historical back·
ground of the grand jury procedure and holding
that a witness is not entitled to representation
by counsel before the grand jury, see Jones v.
United States, 119 U.S. App. D.C. 284, 342
F.2d 863; United States v. Cleary, 2 Cir., 265
F.2d 459; United States v. Scully, 2 Cir., 255
F.2d 113, 116."
In People v. Iamiello, N.Y. S. Ct. (N.Y. Cty.).
35 U.S. Law 'Veek 2003 (1966), a New York County
court ruled that there was no right to counsel in the
jury room but indicated that an opportunity to consult
with counsel during a recess of the grand jury shoulrl
be provided.
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It is obvious, therefore, that the overwhelming
weight of authority at the present time is to the effect
that there is no right to counsel at the time of an
appearance by an individual before a grand jury.
Meshbesher, Right to Co1.1,nsel Before a Grand Jury,
pages 28-29 ( 1966) ; Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d
199 (10th Cir. 1942) .

The attempt of defendant to invoke the decision
of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, would not, in any way
sustain a contention that counsel for a witness before
a grand jury is a constitutional requirement. The
Miranda case clearly dealt with police interrogation.
Indeed, a substantial portion of the Miranda case dealt
with consideration of police manuals and texts, chiefly,
Inbau and Reed, Criminal and Interrogation Conf essions ( 1962), and O'Hara, Funda?nentals of Criminal
Investigation ( 1959) . The data used by the court
clearly was concerned with basic conditions surrounding
the interrogation by police. George, Constitutional
Limits on Evidence in Criminal Cases, page 104
(1966) . See especially, the discussion concerning the
efforts to trick and cajole a suspect by police, alluded
to in Justice Warren's opinion in the Miranda case.
The whole context of the case seems to be involved
with police interrogation during the time the individual
is in police custody. This is an entirely different circumstance than the situation where the witness appears
in a grand jury proceeding where an officer of the court
is present and where he is in relatively neutral circumstances before citizens of his own community. Conse-
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quently, there is no analogy between the apparent eyi\
the supreme court was attempting to control by the
Miranda decision and the position of a witness appearing before a grand jury.
The decision of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 ( 1964), is equally ioapplicable to the grand jury
proceeding, unless there has been some form of accusatory process directed against the witness, such as the
filing of a complaint, or an arraignment proceeding
where counsel has already been appointed for him. In
the Massiah case, the United States Supreme Court
indicated that post arraignment interrogation was improper in the absence of the presence of counsel. This
case, therefore, is not legitimately in a posture to
support the argument that counsel should be available
to witnesses when called to testify before a grand jury,
unless some prior arraignment proceeding was still
pending against the witness.
In addition, plaintiff submits that even if there
were a constitutional right to counsel in the grand jury
room, that the absence of counsel would not be a basis
to suppress allegedly perjurious testimony. Especially '
should this be so where it is acknowledged by the witness, as in this case, that he was a voluntary witness
and did not demand counsel, but merely wanted his
request made of record. In addition, the witness being
the chief law enforcement officer of the State and ac·
knowledging his familiarit~r with constitutional rights.
would hardly be in a position to claim that he shoulrl

lh

be excused from his perjury because of the absence of

counsel.

The Supreme Court of the United States in
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 443 ( 1958), acknowledged that where a 31-year-old graduate law student
who was being held for the charge of murder had asked
for the opportunity to obtain counsel and was denied
that opportunity, the confession would still be deemed
admissible, even though no advice was given to the
defendant concerning his right to remain silent. Admittedly, the decision in the Crooker case is no longer
applicable to the confession situation because of the
rule of Miranda. It certainly is relevant in determining
whether, in the context of the instant case, there was a
need for the witness to have counsel before the grand
jury and also whether, in the face of the absence of
counsel, the allegedly perjurious testimony should be
suppressed on any valid theory.
The State acknowledges that this court in two cases,
State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P.2d 723 (1948),
and State v. Hutchinson, 114 Utah 409, 200 P.2d 733
(1948), has indicated that where a witness is compelled
to give testimony in disregard of his constitutional
rights against self-incrimination, that evidence so given
cannot be made the basis for a perjury charge. However, this is an entirely different situation than the case
now before the court, since the witness here indicated
that he was a "voluntary" witness and was not compelled over a claim of self-incrimination to give testi1nony.
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The same argument made by the witness Brad 1,
below was raised recently in the case of United Stat;,,
v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2nd Cir. 1965). In that case,
a witness before a federal grand jury was charged with
perjury. His testimony before the grand jury was
compelled by subpoena. The contention was made that
the evidence obtained was in violation of the witness'
constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimi·
nation. The court said, even so, that the absence of
counsel would not preclude the charge of perjury on
the false testimony. It is submitted that a distinction,
and a very real one, can be drawn between the situation
where a witness is compelled to take the stand and to
give evidence against himself over his objection, as was
the case in Byington and Hutchinson, and the situation
in the instant case where Brady evidenced a willingness
to testify and where the question of presence or absence
of counsel would be most unlikely to affect the truth
or falsity of what was said.
All things being considered, it is submitted that
the defendant erred in basing his order to suppress on
the absence of counsel in the grand jury room.
An author, commenting recently upon the obli·
gation of an attorney to his client, when he is under
federal investigation, stated:
"A potential defendant or a witness before a
grand jury has no righ~ to counsel (in the _roo~) ·
no right to confrontation. or cross-exammatJon,
and no right to submit evidence that will rebut
other evidence presented to the jury. He need
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not even be told the subject-matter or names of
persons under investigation." Dillon, When
Your C,lient is Under F1 ederal I nvestigati<Yn,
Part Six, 12 Practical Lawyer No. 3, p. 71,
March, 1966.
There is neither a state nor federal constitutional
requirement that counsel be present with a witness in
the grand jury room. ~""'urther, there is a general inference to be drawn from Brady's conduct in the grand
jury room that he had, in fact, consulted counsel prior
to his appearance and had been instructed to request
counsel in order to attempt to extend the Escobedo
rule, and the actual desire for counsel was more one
of legal sham than actual need for protection. Also,
his willingness to be a witness evidences no prejudice.
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that this
court should issue its extraordinary writ compelling
withdrawal of the previous order of suppression executed by the defendant.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT ERRED IN GRANTING C. ,V. BRADY, JR.'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE 'VAS
A TARGET WITNESS AND THAT HIS
RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
WERE VIOLATED.
\Vhen Brady appeared before the Salt Lake County
Grand Jury, he was expressly advised by the district
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attorney that he had a right not to give any testirnoni
the answer to which might tend to incriminate him 0;1
any subject . .Further, when he was told that counsel
would not be permitted in the grand jury room, 1i~
expressly indicated that he was a volunteer witne:;s
and would subject himself to questioning. Although
Brady had apparently been served with a subpoena,
he appeared at the time of his appearance. It is submitted that under these circumstances, there was no
denial of the constitutional right against self-incrimination, either under the state or federal constitutions.
The defendant apparently ruled that Brady was
a target of investigation, and that, consequently, he
could not be called before the grand jury and asked
questions and that if he was so confronted, testimony
given under such circumstances could not be used as
the basis for a perjury complaint. This ruling requires
an analysis of the nature of a grand jury in the State
of Utah. There is no provision in the Utah Constitution
granting to a defendant in a criminal case the absolute
right to have his case presented to a grand jury. The
principal means of commencing prosecution in the
State of Utah is by a complaint followed by an infor·
mation, at least in felony cases and cases of indictable
misdemeanors. The Utah Constitution provides for the
calling of a grand jury under present law only whcu
the judges of the district determine that the com·ening
of a grand jury is in the interest of justice. Article 1
Section 13, Constitution of the State of Utah. CoHsc·
quently, it is apparent that grand juries are not a' 1
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integral part of the routine criminal prosecution of
eases in the State of Utah.
Historically, grand juries have been of two forms,
accusatorial and inquisitorial. The early form of the
grand jury at common law was more of an accusatorial
body in that 12 of 23 grand jurors had to join in the
accusation against a defendant, and at one time, the
gra11d jury's accusation was the principal means of
initiating criminal prosecutions. Moreland, Modern
Criminal Procedure, page 193 ( 1959) ; 1 Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England, 252 (1883).
Subsequently, grand juries became less accusatorial
and more inquisitorial, especially in the western part
of the United States. Thus, Moreland, supra, notes at
page 194:
"Grand jury procedure, fundamentally, is an
investigation, not a trial. The modern grand jury
has two main functions. First, it inquires into
crime in the community and, second, it has general inquisitorial powers with respect to social
conditions and public institutions and officers.
"The attention of the grand jurors may be
directed to possible criminal actions in the community by the court, by the prosecuting attorney, by a volunteer from the community who
comes before them of his own free will, or by a
member of their own body who communicates
such information to them."
The Utah grand jury procedure is, in part, based
upon the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal
Procedure, secs. 132, 135, 136 ( 1931) , and is inquisi-
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torial in nature. Indeed, counsel for Brady at the time
of the motion to suppress acknowledged that a grand
jury is usually a "new experience" for each distriC'l
attorney (R. 67). It, therefore, should be acknowledged
that a crucial determination in analyzing cases applying
the so-called "target" of investigation rule has often
been whether the function of the grand jury is accusatorial or inquisitorial. In the decision of the defendant
granting the motion to suppress, reference was made
to cases from Eastern states and where the grand jury
functions primarily as an accusatorial body. Additional analysis of this factor will be made in discussing
the particular cases applying the so-called target of
investigation rule. It is essential to determine whether
there is any prohibition against calling as a witness
an individual whose conduct may be suspect.
In the instant case, Brady was called as a witness
at a time when no charges were pending against him.
He had been judicially exonerated from any criminal
involvement with bribery or misuse of public funds.
Judge Morris had dismissed the complaints filed against
him and found any evidence of his participation in
actions which would tend to show bribery or misuse ol'
public funds insufficient to even demonstrate probable
cause. It is, of course, natural that a grand jury
sitting in Salt Lake County would, among many other
matters of investigation, make inquiry into functiom
of county government. Undoubtedly, there would be
those who would object to Judge J\forris' determination
and the grand jury would, of course, satisfy itself as
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whether there was any fire where there was smoke.
This, however, does ~ot mean that Brady was a target,
as meaningless as that term is, of the grand jury's
actions. It merely means that the conduct of Brady
would have been examined by the grand jury. However, there was no attempt to present the case before
the grand jury to let the grand jury make an accusation as is of ten done where there is a constitutional
requirement that an individual be given the opportunity
to be indicted by a grand jury. Even so, the so-called
target of investigation rule is a distinct minority position.
to

In lVIeshbesher, Right to Counsel Before a Grand
Jury, page 6 ( 1966), the author, arguing admittedly
as an advocate for the right of counsel before a grand
jury, acknowledges the so-called target rule as a minority position. He states:
"There is, though, a line of enlightened state
court cases which hold that if a possible defendant testifies before a grand jury, his privilege
against self-incrimination, even if not asserted,
is violated and as a result is protected from indictment based on any of his incriminating testimony, as well as evidence obtained therefrom.
This appears to be the rninority view and has
not been followed in the federal courts."
A witness before a grand jury, of course, may not
mvoke the right to remain absolutely silent on matters
that are not incriminatory. Cipes, Moore's Federal
Practice, Vol. 8, 2nd Ed., p. 6.06 [2]. However, he
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may, as Brady was advised in the instant case, invohr
his privilege against self-incrimination at anytime aiid
may not be punished for contempt of court, un]e;,
after a judicial determination has been made by tht
court and not by the grand jury, he continues to refuse
to answer. Anno. 38 A.L.R.2d 248. Consequently, had
Brady at anytime considered that any of the testimony
he gave would have the slightest tendency to incriminait
him, he was free to invoke his privilege which wou!tl
most probably have been respected, but even if not, lit
could have had the propriety of the invocation deter·
mined by the court with the aid of counsel.
In the trial court, at the time of argument ou !ht
motion to suppress, Brady's counsel relied heavily upo11
the decisions of State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388. 2011
P.2d 723 (1948), and State v. Hutchingson, 114 Utah
409, 200 P.2d 33 (1948), for the principle that eviderm
obtained in violation of the right against self-incrimi·
nation could not be the basis for a perjury prosecution.
These cases clearly are not applicable to the instanl
situation, since Brady was, first, thoroughly adYised
of his right to ref use to answer incriminating questiom.
and second, expressed a willingness to testify as a yo]·
unteer witness and at no time invoked the privilegr
against self-incrimination. In both the Byington allll
the Hutchinson cases, there was a complete disregaril
of the witness' right not to incriminate himself and h11
testimony was, in fact, compelled over objectio 11
Further, no advice was given to the witness as to tJi,
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
24

In People v. Nathanson, 134 Cal.App.2d 43, 28~
P.Zd 975, a defendant appeared before a grand jury
under subpoena and was advised at the beginning of
his testimony that he could refuse to answer incriminating questions. He, thereafter, indicated a willingness
to testify and an indictment resulted. The California
court ruled that the failure to assert the privilege, after
the witness was advised of his constitutional rights, made
the indictment invulnerable, irrespective of whether
the witness was a suspect for a particular crime at the
time he appeared before the grand jury.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
the case of United States Z'. Clcin, 247 F.2d 908 (2nd
Circuit) , reached a similar result. See also United
States v. Garnes, 258 F.2d 530 (2nd Circuit; United
States v. A nnunziato, 293 F .2d 373 (2nd Circuit).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Keenan, 267 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied 361 U.S. 863, ruled that where a party was only
a "potential" defendant when he testified before a
grand jury, an indictment subsequently returned would
not be invalidated where he was informed of his rights
and testified without coercion. Accord, United States
t'. Okin, 254 F. Supp. 553 (D.C. N.J.)
Another case very directly in point on the instant
issue is United States v. Hoffa, 156 F.Supp. 495
ID.C.S.D.N.Y. 1957). In that case, a motion to suppress was made upon the basis that testimony obtained
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at a grand jury hearing was obtained in violation 11
the constitutional right to counsel. The court note
that the contentions of Hoffa were that:

:
1

"The perjury indictment is predicated uponj
proceeding in which the defendant was called tn
testify as a witness before the grand jury, i1 1
violation of his common law and constitutional
rights."
The court noted that the "thrust" of the defendanL
contention was that at the time the defendant was sulipoenaed before the grand jury, the Government kne11
that he was a prospective defendant and that counsel
was not allowed to be present. The court noted that
the preliminary inquiry concerning Mr. Hoffa's conduei
indicated to Hoffa that he was a voluntary witness anJ
that he was advised of his rights against self-incrimi·
nation at the time he went into the grand jury room.
In rejecting his contention, the court observed:
"On the contrary, defendant went into thr
grand jury room fully conscious of the natur'.
of the inquiry, fully cognizant of what most ol
the other witnesses had already told the grand
jury, fully aware of the risk he was taking when
he waived his Fifth Amendment privilege, full)'
briefed in advance by counsel, and fully advised
of counsel thereafter in the course of the grand
jury session. He cannot now convert his gran 1I
jury appearance into an immunity bath."
The case is similar to the instant one since whe1
Mr. Brady went into the courtroom, he was advised
of his constitutional rights, indicated that he was :i

1
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',\illing witness, indicated that he did not demand the

presence of counsel, and also indicated that he was
familiar with the right to counsel and various other
rights that a defendant in a case was allowed. Under
these circumstances, there could be no basis for granting
a motion to suppress.
A landmark case is United States v. Scully, 225
F.2d 113 (2nd Cir. 1955), where the defendant was
convicted of conspiracy to defraud. The court rejected
the very issue which the defendant predicated his decision on, and did so, stating:
"These considerations do not apply to the inquisitorial proceedings of a grand jury. Such a
body is not charged with the duty of deciding
innocence or guilt and, for this reason, its proceedings have never been conducted with the
assiduous regard for the preservation of procedural safeguards which normally attends the
ultimate trial of the issues. Thus, in such proceedings, there is no right to counsel, no right
of confrontation, no right to cross-examination
or to introduce evidence in rebuttal and ordinarily no requirement that the evidence introduced be only such as would be admissible upon
a trial. See United States v. Costello, 2 Cir.,
1955, 221 F.2d 668.
If, as and when the question, whether the
bundle of rights in the Fifth Amendment includes that of a defendant, already charged as by
indictment, to a warning when subsequently
called to testify before a grand jury, is squarely
before us, it seems not unlikely that reasons other
than the distinction between parties and mere
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witnesses, above referred to, many convince u'
that, under certain circumstances or absoluteh.
a warning is required. '¥ e do not now say t1i;11
it is not, but only that this court has not rukc
on the point.
It is at least clear that a prudent prosecutm
to forestall the possibility of error, will in sud
cases give a warning. Indeed, one would sur·
pose that, as a matter of ethics or fair play or
policy, a prosecutor would in all cases refraiL
from calling as a witness before a grand jur:
any person who is dejure or de factor an accused.
The absence of appeals to this court involving
the problem under discussion would seem to in·
dicate that some such rule or practice is observea
in the prosecutors' offices in this circuit.

And so we now hold that the mere possibilit,~
that the witness may later be indicted furnislw
no basis for requiring that he be advised of h/.,
rights under the Fifth Amendment, when sum
maned to give testimony before a grand jul'}J
We shall decide other cases as they arise." (Em
phasis added.)
In the instant case, there was no intention of the
prosecutor "to seek the witness' indictment." Rather
the matter was one of investigation and inquiry. Also e
.
.
warnmg was given.
The cases of Wilson v. United States, 163 U.S
613, and Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, botJ,
referred to in the Scully case, clearly support the facr
that the motion to suppress should not have been grant
ed in the instant case.
In TVilson v. United States, supra, the defen<lnn
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in custody before a magistrate who questioned him
). without warning of his rights nor allowing him counsel.
:d The Supreme Court noted:

u,

was

~u

11.

:I,

u

ir

"And it is laid down that it is not essential
to the admissibility of a confession that it should
appear that the person was warned that what
he said would be used against him, but on the
contrary, if the confession was voluntary, it is
sufficient though it appear that he was not so
warned."
The court then went on to the facts of the case and
noted:
"It is true that, while he was not sworn, he
made the statement before a commissioner who
was investigating a charge against him, as he
was informed; he was in custody but not in irons;
there had been threats of mobbing him the night
before the examination; he did not have the aid
of counsel, and he was not warned that the statement might be used against him or advised that
he need not answer."
In United States v. Lawn, ll5 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953), the court noted:

"A mere witness may properly be subpoenaed
to appear and testify before the grand jury,
though he may not be compelled to incriminate
himself, Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273,
39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979, and he need not be
warned of his privilege, but to avail himself of
it, he must plead it whenever the answer to a
question may incriminate him. United State~ v.
Benjamin, 2 Cir., 1941, 120 F.2d 521; Umted
States v. Miller, D.C., 80 F. Supp. 979."
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In 38 A.L.R.2d 237, it is stated with reference
to the privilege against self-incrimination:

C

b

"It has been stated on appeal in several case~
that the privilege does not include the right to
refuse to be sworn or testify at all but merely
includes the right to refuse to answer a particular question under the proper circumstances."

g

te
tl
I

C

Although there are cases which indicate that if a
witness is brought before a grand jury by a prosecutor
for the purposes of seeking the indictment of the witness, his testimony cannot be used against him. A large
number of the cases, indeed the overwhelming majority,
have indicated that where the witness is advised of
his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and,
thereafter, testifies, the evidence is admissible. 38
A.L.R.2d, pages 276, 278. Further, courts have found
that where the investigation was not pinpointed, as such,
against the particular defendant, but he was merely
a class of persons being investigaetd, this will not excuse
perjurious testimony before a grand jury. 38 A.L.R.
2d 285.
Counsel for Brady relied, at the time of argument,
on the cases of People v. Tomacello, 264 N.Y.S.2d
686 ( 1965), and People v. Yonkers Contracting Company, 263 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1965), and other New York
cases, applying the so-called "target" of investigation
rule. However, these cases and cases from other jurisdictions having comparable constitutional provisions
to New York are not applicable.
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In United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2nd
Cir. 1965), the defendant was convicted of perjury
before a federal grand jury. His testimony before the
grand jury was compelled under subpoena. The contention was made that it was in violation of his constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination.
In response to the self-incrimination argument, the
court stated :
"Short shrift may be made of appellant's claim
that the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the Government from ever
summoning before a grand jury one who has
become a target of inquiry and is a 'potential'
defendant. TVhatcvcr IMJ,IJ uc the rule in the
State of New Y orlt', the F'ifth A mendrnent docs
riot proscribe the practice here invei,qhed a,qainst.
Repeatedly, this court has so ruled, declining
to equate the position of a 'potential' defendant
called before a grand jury with that of one already on trial."
The court notes that the New York decisions are totally
inapplicable under the Federal Constitution. Further,
the court cites several decisions from federal courts
rlirectly to the contrary where the claim has been raised
based on the Federal Constitution. See United State.~
P. Pappadio, 346 F.2d .5 (2nd Cir. 1965), where the
court again refused to say that there was any constitutional basis for the "target" rule; and United States
r'. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
H60 U.S. 936. To the same effect is United States v.
Srnlfy, 22.5 F.2d 113 (2nd Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350

e.s.

897.
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In the \Vinter case, the court went on to say:

"To suggest that once an individual is nameJ , '[
by witnesses before a grand jury under circun 1 I
stances which may lead to his indictment, he 1
thereby automatically gains immunity from subpoena would denude that ancient body of a suustantial right of inquiry. This grand jury was
engaged in a broad investigation of alleged
bribery and corruption of FHA officials. It
had the right, and indeed the duty, to follow leads
wherever they pointed, to determine whether
bribery and other illegal practices had been engaged in and, if so, what builders and official .
were involved and how far up the official ladder I
the alleged wrongdoing extended. It had a legiti- i1
mate interest in summoning 'Vinter before it." s.

I
1·

Thus, the Winter case rejects the New York rule as ' 11
having any application under the Federal Constitution a
and does so with a rather substantial analysis of the
federal and state law. It is submitted, therefore, that I
there is no constituional basis to contend that the target
rule as the defendant states it is somehow applicable
to his case and warrants the suppression of his testi· 1
mony before the grand jury. Further, it is submitted I t
that the defendant has failed to bring himself factually I t
within the target rule situation.
a

I

I

The present Constitution of the ~tate of_ ~ew I e
York expressly grants an accused the right to md1ct· (
ment by a grand jury. Indeed, the requirement of pre· I 1
sentment of a case to the grand jury is mandatory in I
the absence of a waiver. 26 Albany Law Review, page
1; sec. 253.2, Code of Criminal Procedure of New .

I
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York; Article I, Section 6, Constitution of New York.
The latter provision provides:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on indictment before a grand jury."
Thus, the function of a grand jury in the State of New
York is entirely different than the general investigatory
grand juries traditional in Utah. New York State
Constitutional Convention ( 1938), 3 Revised Record
2570.

I

It is submitted, therefore, that the defendant erred
in granting the motion to suppress and that this court
should issue its extraordinary writ compelling the
, withdrawal of the order and allowing the prosecution
I against Brady to proceed.

.
I

CONCLUSION

The decision of the defendant, if allowed to stand,
would effectively emasculate the grand jury system in
[ the State of Utah. Investigations into public corruplion and misdoing would, so long as our prosecuting
attorneys remain 8ubject to political pressures and
1
election be substantially diluted and wholly ineffective.
Obviously, the imposition of the rule that the defendant
I imposed in this case, being in excess of that compelled
by the federal constitution, being unrelated to the context of the Utah Constitution, and being contrary to
>tatute, was erroneous and should not be left standing.
1
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Respectfully submitted,
JAYE. BANKS
District Attorney
Third Judicial District
Attorney for Plaintiff
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